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Abstract: This article provides an in-depth case study of the enforcement 
of copyright in photographs by certain rights-owners today: freelance 
professional photographers who derive income from the exploitation of 
photographic copyright. Referring to the theoretical framework of Guido 
Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, the article reflects on the 
implications of the case study for the nature and function of copyright in 
a specific context today. Bringing the experience today into conversation 
with the enforcement of copyright by professional photographers in past 
times (the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries), the article notes the 
influence of the bureaucratisation of copyright exploitation (ie 
exploitation through picture libraries) on legal decision making in a 
particular forum today: the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Small 
Claims Track. The article concludes with more general reflections on the 
case study’s implications for the courts and copyright policy-makers 
today.  
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1. Introduction 
This article presents a detailed case study of the copyright enforcement 
practices of certain rights-holders today: freelance professional 
photographers who derive income from the commercial exploitation of 
photographic copyright. It also brings those findings into conversation 
with original research as to the copyright practices of professional 
photographers historically. In exploring similarities and differences 
between past and present, the article draws out fresh perspectives on the 
nature and function of copyright in a particular context today.  
Our analysis refers to two concepts from the classic theoretical 
framework set out by Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, in their 
seminal Harvard Law Review article Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral which, as we explain below, 
have been applied in subsequent scholarship to intellectual property 
rights: ‘property rules’ and ‘liability rules’. A property rule provides the 
rights-holder with a veto over the use of an entitlement – its use requires 
a transaction individually negotiated with the rights-holder - whereas a 
liability rule allows the use of an entitlement so long as a person is 
willing to pay a collectively determined value for it at a later date (eg the 
payment of a compulsory licence fee).1 Copyright doctrine reflects the 
                                                        
* The authors would like to thank Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer, Ruth Towse, Alison Firth, Jessica Sibley, Stephen Bogle, Pauline McBride and Jill 
Robbie for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The authors also benefitted from the discussion of the paper following a presentation as part of the 
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property rule paradigm; it is premised on the rights-holder’s exclusive 
rights to authorise or prohibit certain restricted acts (eg reproduction) in 
relation to the protected subject matter.2 However, our case study reveals 
that, as enforced by certain rights-holders, copyright in practice exhibits 
features of a liability rule.  
In making these observations, this article adds to scholarship 
pointing to other instances of the ‘intermediate nature’ of intellectual 
property in the property rule/liability rule framework, in particular the 
California Law Review article by Robert P Merges: Contracting into 
Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations.3 Merges highlighted the manner in which the collective 
agreements concluded by groups of rights-holders, facilitating the 
collective valuation of intellectual property entitlements (eg by copyright 
                                                                                                                                                              
CREATe Studio seminar series, at CREATe, Glasgow University, in December 2016. The authors also thank the professional photographers who participated 
in interviews and responded to email enquiries by both co-authors, and CREATe, University of Glasgow, for funding the transcription of cases decided by the 
Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (Grant no: AH/K000179/1). 
1 1971-1972, 85 Harvard Law Review, 1089, 1092. This theoretical framework – referred to by one intellectual property scholar as ‘the foundational literature 
on legal entitlements’ (Robert P Merges, ‘Of Property Rules, Coase and Intellectual Property’ (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2655) - has been applied by a 
number of scholars to intellectual property law, perhaps most famously Robert P. Merges, ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations’, (1996) 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293, 1303, discussed below. For other examples applying the Calabresi/Melamed framework to 
intellectual property see Mark A Lemley, ‘Contracting Around Liability Rules’ (2012) 100 Cal. L. Rev. 463; Dotan Oliar, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
the Intentional Infliction of Harm’ (2012) 64 Stan. L. Rev 951; Jerome H. Reichman, ‘Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms’ (1994) 94 
Colum. L. Rev. 2432. 
2 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 s.16; Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC, Art 2 and 3. 
3 Merges, above n 1, 1392. 
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collecting societies) turns intellectual property rights into a ‘liability rule-
like regime’.4 Our analysis reveals the manner in which the enforcement 
of photographic copyright by the IPEC SCT broadens such trends; court 
rulings further extend the influence of bureaucratic standards: the 
licensing practices of picture libraries. 
The article begins by developing a central finding of a broader 
empirical study5 into the operation of the Intellectual Property Enterprise 
Court Small Claims Track (hereafter ‘IPEC SCT’), a specialist list within 
the Chancery Division, High Court of Justice for intellectual property 
claims worth under £10,000. A review of all court files,6 from the Court’s 
creation in October 2012 to 31 December 2015, reveals that a substantial 
number of these cases are successful claims by freelance professional 
photographers, or their agents, for on-line infringement of photographic 
copyright. Further, in the overwhelming majority of cases, financial 
remedies alone are sought and granted. As we show, the IPEC SCT is the 
freelance professional photographers’ forum of choice, and therefore the 
cases it hears are representative of these rights-holders’ court 
enforcement practices.  
                                                        
4 Ibid. 1302, 1303 and 1392. 
5 The empirical study carried out by Sheona Burrow, PhD Candidate, CREATe, University of Glasgow, supervised by Martin Kretschmer and Kris Erickson, 
University of Glasgow and by Ronan Deazley, Queen’s University Belfast: Access to Justice in the Small Claims Track of the Intellectual Property Enterprise 
Court (IPEC): An Empirical Enquiry into Use by Creative SMEs, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 2017. 
6 Though as to problems in locating certain court files: see n 29.  
 5 
In the first section of this article, we contextualise these findings – 
particularly the observation that, in the main, financial remedies alone are 
claimed - through an analysis of 21 IPEC SCT judgments on liability 
and/or quantum obtained from the Court. These cases constitute all IPEC 
SCT claims brought by photographers/their agents during the period 
October 2012 to 31 December 2015 in which the Court confirmed that a 
judgment was delivered and was able to provide the information 
necessary for transcription.7 This section argues that the nature of the 
relief sought by rights-holders and granted by the courts has implications 
for the nature of photographic copyright in this context.  
In particular, we conclude that the standardisation of photographic 
copyright licensing, through the widespread use of picture libraries such 
as Getty and Corbis, impacts on the nature of the damages calculation 
submitted by claimants and conducted by the Court. The legal test for 
calculating compensatory damages is premised on a hypothetical bilateral 
licence concluded between a willing licensor and willing licensee in the 
particular position of the claimant and the defendant, an approach which 
                                                        
7 The review by Sheona Burrow of all Court Files in the period 2012-2015 revealed a total of 28 cases brought by photographers or their agents in which a 
judgment was delivered. Two of these cases were decided on the papers, but despite two formal requests to the Court, a copy of the judgments was not 
provided. Of the 26 cases in which a judgment was delivered following a hearing, the Court provided the necessary details for a judgment to be transcribed in 
relation to 21 of these cases. It was not possible to transcribe the 5 remaining cases because, despite numerous requests, the Court did not provide accurate 
details of the Court Room number in which proceedings took place, which is an essential pre-requisite for the correct tape to be located by the Court 
Recordings and Transcription Unit.  
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reflects copyright’s property rule basis; as we explained above, the 
Calabresi/Melamed framework provides that the use of an entitlement 
protected by a property rule requires the payment of a price determined 
by a transaction individually negotiated with the rights-holder, rather than 
a collectively determined value. 8  However, we show that the Court 
frequently resolves this enquiry by applying the collectively determined 
standard rates offered by picture libraries, even in cases brought by non-
member claimants (ie claimants who do not in fact trade through those 
libraries). As these libraries offer licences to whoever seek them, in this 
context, photographic copyright in practice exhibits features of a liability 
rule – as Robert Merges termed, ‘a general rule of compensation 
applicable to all who take the right’.9  
 In the second part of this article, we turn to the enforcement 
practices of professional photographers from far earlier times: the time of 
the establishment of the first picture libraries or agencies for the 
exploitation of photographic copyright. The late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries saw a number of technological changes that 
fundamentally altered the practices of professional photographers: the 
freeing of photography from the confines of the studio and the emergence 
of new channels of dissemination of photographs with the introduction of 
                                                        
8 Text to n 1. 
9 Robert P. Merges, above n 1, 1303. 
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the first photographic illustrated newspapers. Drawing on original 
archival work, 10  we uncover the ways in which professional 
photographers adapted to these changes including the role played by the 
first picture libraries.  
The concluding section of this article draws together the IPEC SCT 
and historical case studies. Both case studies concern copyright authors, 
in the face of technological change (the internet today and the 
technological changes enabling the emergence of the photographic press 
in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century) seeking to stabilise their 
earnings in the face of challenge: the ‘culture of the free’ on the internet 
today, and attacks on photography’s creative status in the late 
nineteenth/early twentieth century. We analyse the role, both in the past 
and present, of the collective organisation of photographers, court 
enforcement and bureaucratisation of exploitation (ie exploitation through 
picture libraries), as techniques for averting those challenges and 
asserting a culture of payment for use. In particular, we argue that an 
historical viewpoint allows us to chart changes through time in the 
relationship between court rulings – premised on doctrinal rules that treat 
copyright as a property rule - and the bureaucratisation of exploitation (ie 
                                                        
10 This work was conducted by Elena Cooper. These findings are developed further in a monograph to be published by Cambridge University Press, 
concerning the history of artistic copyright more generally, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century: Art and Modern Copyright: The Contested Image. 
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exploitation through picture libraries) – in which copyright takes on 
features of a liability rule.  
On one level, the bureaucratisation of exploitation reveals 
continuity between past and present: the collective management of 
copyright is far from new. Indeed, we show it to have a far longer history 
than is currently assumed. Existing scholarship connects the 
bureaucratisation of copyright exploitation – where parties to copyright 
transactions ‘deal primarily with a bureaucracy’ (ie a collecting society or 
picture library) and ‘experience a process more like paying taxes or 
procuring welfare’ - with developments in the exploitation of broadcast 
copyright in the 1920s (eg the foundation of ASCAP - the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers - ‘that statistically 
approximates a system of market exchanges of copyrighted goods in 
situations where such exchanges are unworkable’) 11  as well as the 
emergence of the first music collecting societies following the passage of 
the Copyright Act 1911. 12  By contrast, we show that the first 
                                                        
11 Thomas Streeter, ‘Broadcast Copyright and the Bureaucratization of Property’ in M. Woodmansee and P. Jaszi, The Construction of Authorship: Textual 
Appropriation in Law and Literature (USA: Duke University Press, 1994) pp 303-326, 312 and 310, also published at (1991-1992) 10 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 
567. 
12 Jose Bellido and Fiona Macmillan, ‘Music Copyright After Collectivisation’(2016) IPQ 231, 231, arguing that the Copyright Act 1911 set the ‘cornerstone 
of the modern “music business”’ with which the emergence of the first music collecting societies was closely connected. Bellido and Macmillan characterise 
the Performing Rights Society (founded in 1914) as ‘a prime example’ of Streeter’s ‘ ‘“ensuing bureaucratisation of copyright” that characterised the 20th 
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photographic picture libraries were established in the first years of the 
twentieth century.13 Our historical account also differs from scholarship 
on music and broadcasting copyright: copyright authors instigated the 
early bureaucratisation of photographic copyright – the establishment of 
the first picture libraries - rather than publishers (as in the case of music) 
or other non-authorial interests (in the case of broadcasting).14  
Appreciating this longer history to bureaucratisation - the 
longstanding role of picture libraries - also enables us to identify what is 
different today and to assess more critically the significance of IPEC SCT 
litigation as regards the relation between bureaucratisation (ie the 
exploitation of copyright through picture libraries) and photographic 
copyright enforcement: in the IPEC SCT, judicial decisions are shaped by 
the bureaucratic standards of picture libraries. In contrast to Thomas 
Streeter’s account of broadcast copyright in the 1920s, in which the 
bureaucratic ‘simulation’ of property – the exploitation of copyright 
through collecting societies - is presented as ‘a representation once 
                                                                                                                                                              
century’ (at 244). For more on the history of music publishing, including the establishment of the first music collecting societies: Ruth Towse, ‘Economics of 
Music Publishing: Copyright and the Market’ (2016) Journal of Cultural Economics 1-18. 
13 Our account also differs from the assumptions of certain scholarship about the bureaucratisation of photographic copyright in more recent times: that the 
emergence of photographic picture libraries is a recent phenomenon. See Brad Holland, ‘First Things About Secondary Rights’ (2005-2006) 29 Colum. J. L. & 
Arts 295, 295. 
14 Bellido and Macmillan, above n 12, 232: ‘Unlike other music collecting societies in Europe, the PRS was initiated by publishers rather than composers.’ 
Streeter, above n 11, p 309. 
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removed… that has taken on a life of its own, divorced from its 
referent’,15 we argue that the legal rulings of the IPEC SCT, in providing 
a central role for certain picture library standards, make aspects of 
bureaucratisation part of copyright’s legal reality. This in turn has 
implications for the nature of copyright in practice, in this particular 
context, within Calabresi/Melamed’s theoretical framework. The article 
closes with reflections on the implications for these observations for both 
the Court and policy-makers today. 
 
2. Photographic Copyright in the IPEC SCT  
 
(a) Introducing the IPEC SCT 
By way of background, the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Small 
Claims Track was established in October 2012 by way of amendments to 
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.16 Initially, it was part of the small claims 
track of the Patents County Court. However, with the establishment of the 
Intellectual Property Enterprise Court, a Court within the Chancery 
Division of the High Court of Justice, on 1st October 2013, it was 
reconstituted as a specialist listing for small claims cases at the 
                                                        
15 Thomas Streeter, above n 11, p 325. 
16 Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 2) Rules 2012/2208. 
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Intellectual Property Enterprise Court.17 Litigants seeking resolution of 
disputes concerning copyright, trade marks and unregistered design rights 
have the option of using the small claims track for resolution of claims up 
to a value of £10,000.18 The small claims track is based in London.  
The establishment of the IPEC SCT followed recommendations in 
the Review of Civil Litigation Costs undertaken by Lord Justice Jackson 
in 2009-2010, 19  which aimed to review ‘the rules and principles 
governing to costs of civil justice and make recommendations in order to 
promote access to justice at proportionate cost’; concepts of access to 
justice are ubiquitous in English civil justice, particularly since the 
reforms following from Lord Woolf’s 1995/6 report Access to Justice.20 
Lord Justice Jackson considered intellectual property claims as a 
particular category. Combining submissions from the legal profession21 
the Federation of Small Businesses,22 and one commissioned empirical 
survey undertaken by the Strategic Advisory Board on Intellectual 
                                                        
17 66th Update, Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
18 Initially, the limit was £5,000 but on 1st April 2013 it was increased to £10,000 by the 60th Update to the Civil Procedure Rule 1998. 
19 R Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report, TSO, December 2009 (hereafter Jackson Review). 
20 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales, (London: HMSO, 1995) and Lord 
Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales, (London: HMSO, 1996) 
21 The IP Court Users’ Committee and the IP Lawyers’ Association were particularly acknowledged by Lord Justice Jackson as influential in this respect – 
Jackson Review, above n 19, p 248, [1.3]. 
22 Jackson Review, Ibid., p 255, [4.1]. 
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Property,23 Lord Justice Jackson suggested that there was ‘an unmet need 
for justice’ for creative Small and Medium Enterprises and recommended 
the introduction of a small claims track in the Patents County Court for IP 
claims.24 This recommendation was followed by Professor Hargreaves’ 
2011 Review of Intellectual Property and Growth,25 which recommended 
its introduction as part of a broader scheme of legislative reform relating 
to intellectual property.26   
The following preliminary observations can be made from an 
unpublished empirical study of the first three years of the IPEC SCT 
(from its establishment in October 2012):27 in the period 1 October 2012 
                                                        
23 Jackson Review, Ibid, p 249, [1.7].  
24 Jackson Review, Ibid, p 255, [4.3] and [4.5]. 
25 I. Hargreaves, Review of Intellectual Property and Growth (IPO, May 2011). 
26 See also Intellectual Property Office, Government Response to the Call for Evidence on Introducing a Small Claims Track into the Patents County Court: 
https://old.ipo.gov.uk/hargreaves-enforce-c4e-pcc-response.pdf  p 13, [2.8]. 
27 This was carried out by Sheona Burrow. See n 5. This used a court-file based methodology (following C. Helmers and L. McDonagh, ‘Patent Litigation in 
the UK: an empirical survey 2000-2008’ (2013) 8(11) Journal of Intellectual Property and Law 846, see also C.A. Cotropia and J. Gibson, ‘Copyright’s 
Topography: An Empirical Study of Copyright Litigation’ (2014) 92 Texas Law Review 1981) to look at claims brought in the IPEC Small Claims Track 
between October 2012 and December 2015. This involved the negotiation of access to court files from the IPEC SCT and the extraction of anonymised data 
from those files through a manual review of paper court files for each claim lodged from the Court’s creation in October 2012 to December 2015. It is 
estimated that 5 per cent of case files were not sampled because they were not physically available for sampling, eg they were removed to a judge’s desk, 
referred to another court or otherwise unavailable. Estimates are based on the fact that in 2015, the court began numbering court files sequentially, allowing the 
author to note the number of files missing at each data collection date. The principal sources of data are the pleadings - claim form and particulars of claim, 
any defences and replies – as well as procedural notes on case management and any orders made in the case. Email correspondence between the parties and the 
Court included in the file also provides valuable information, particularly where cases settle during the court process. The data collected as part of the larger 
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to 31 December 2015, 261 claims were dealt with by the IPEC SCT,28 of 
which the overriding majority (206/261 – 79 per cent) concerned 
copyright infringement. Of these claims, a majority (144) concern the 
infringement of photographic copyright, and the overwhelming majority 
of these (135/144) concern the unauthorised reproduction of a photograph 
on a website.29 The claimants in 122 these cases (46 per cent of all claims 
– 122/261) are freelance professional photographers  – photographers 
who are self employed, and derive income through photography - or their 
agents: 22 claims were brought by agents and 100 claims by 
photographers. Further, these cases generally comprise a claim for 
financial remedies alone: only four of the 122 claims concerning 
photographic copyright included a claim for an injunction, and all 122 
included a claim for damages.30  
IPEC SCT claims are representative of the litigation brought by 
freelance professional photographers. A review of all published 
judgments in the same period (October 2012-December 2015) delivered 
                                                                                                                                                              
empirical study relates to the dates of cases, the value of claims, court fees paid, details about the claimants and defendants, details about the claims and 
defences (if any), notes about court procedure, and details of outcomes through settlement or judicial determination. 
28 The majority were originally issued at IPEC SCT, but some transferred from County Court or from IPEC SCT Multi Track or IPEC SCT Fast Track. Two 
cases just concerned costs, and these are not included in the 261. 
29 The other nine cases concern use in the physical world, eg printed publicity material. 
30 One of these was both for damages and an account of profits; as a matter of law, a claimant is required to elect either damages or an account, though see n 
83 as to some confusion caused by the inclusion of ‘any unfair profits made by the infringer’ within the ‘damages’ provision of the Enforcement Directive (Art 
13(1)(a)). 
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by other courts open to photographers (High Court, IPEC Fast-Track and 
IPEC Multi-Track),31 shows that the IPEC SCT is the litigation forum of 
choice for freelance photographers: only two of all the cases which 
proceeded to judgment in these other forums were brought by freelance 
photographers or their agents. The first in fact originated as an IPEC SCT 
claim, but did not proceed to final judgment; it was only transferred to the 
IPEC Multi-track following an application to set aside an IPEC SCT 
order for an extension of time, and following this, the claim was struck 
out. 32  The other began as a County Court money claim for ‘unpaid 
royalties’ under an invoice issued retrospectively to an infringer (as per 
the pre-IPEC practice discussed below33) before it was transferred to the 
Patents County Court for the assessment of damages for copyright 
infringement (following amendment of the statement of claim).34  
This Part of the article seeks to explain, develop and contextualise 
the finding that freelance professional photographers, in the main, seek 
financial compensation for copyright infringement alone through, first, an 
examination of the motivation of claimants, and secondly, an analysis of 
                                                        
31 The review was conducted by Sheona Burrow and was based on all published judgments included on Westlaw and the British and Irish Legal Information 
website (www.bailii.org). The latter website is understood to contain all IPEC Multi-Track and Fast Track judgments (113 judgments in total) and High Court 
(Patents Court) judgments (a further 113 judgments). The IPEC Multi-Track and Fast-Track was, prior to October 2013, the Patents County Court.  
32 Malcolm-Green v And So To Bed Ltd [2013] EWHC 4016 (IPEC). 
33 Text to n 49-53. 
34 Sheldon v Daybrook House Promotions [2013] EWPCC 26. 
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the legal nature of the cases which they bring, including the manner in 
which financial remedies are calculated. As we conclude below, an 
analysis of these two points within the Calabresi/Melamed framework 
reveals that, while copyright doctrine is based on a property rule 
paradigm, the manner in which photographic copyright is enforced in this 
particular context exhibits features of a liability rule. 
To explore these questions, we applied to the Court for the 
transcription of all judgments on liability and/or quantum in respect of 
IPEC SCT claims brought by photographers or their agents in the period 
under investigation (1 October 2012 to 31 December 2015): we were 
provided with transcripts of 21 judgments.35  Of these, the claimant was 
successful in all cases, save for one, which failed due to a limitation 
issue.36 Further, the overwhelming majority of these judgments concerned 
remedies or quantum alone: in three of these cases judgment was 
obtained in default, in five further cases the defendant did not attend a 
hearing, in one further case the claimant obtained summary judgment on 
the merits and in most other cases, the defendant either admitted liability 
or put the claimant to proof in circumstances where there was no 
                                                        
35 On the number of cases transcribed: n 7. 
36 Herringshaw v Runham, 7.4.2016. 
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meaningful challenge to the claimant’s case on subsistence, title or 
infringement.37  
 
(b) The Nature of Claims 
What does a review of these IPEC SCT judgments reveal about the nature 
of these claims? The claimants in all of the transcribed cases were 
freelance professional photographers. As Clarke DJ described in, Doré v 
Hendrich:  
There is a difference between no fees which are charged by 
amateurs who take photographs and make them available and fees 
which professional photographers believe that they should be paid 
for use of their work.  This is Mr Doré’s work.  What he does is 
take photographs.  If he was not paid for his photographs he would 
not be eating and I do have some sympathy for him and that is 
what this court is here for.38 
                                                        
37 Examples of the latter: Herringshaw v Everton 21.8.2014, Webb v Central Media 17.7.2014, Brown v Mayoh 17.4.2014. Exceptions where substantive 
issues raised: Crawley v Burda, 8.1.2015, dispute over who took the picture at an Essex dog show, ie factual issue over authorship and ownership; Stockfood v 
Propaganda 9.4.2015, picture library’s standing to bring a claim, and factual issue over length of defendant’s infringement; Doré v Hendrich, 16.1.2014, 
factual issue over whether defendant made the post on the internet; Seaward v Foxtons 5.2.2015 and Yeats v Wright 6.3.2014 nature of previous dealings 
between claimant and defendant; Webb v VA Events 5.3.2015: status of corporate defendant that had since been liquidated, and personal liability of its 
directors/shareholders as joint tortfeasors. 
38 Doré v Hendrich at [19]. 
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Further, the images in question were, in general, 39  described as high 
quality images.40 In all the transcribed cases, save for one,41 the claimants 
were professional photographers who sought to derive income from 
licensing their images, or picture libraries that were exclusive licensees of 
such photographers. Therefore, in the main, the ‘fees’ referred to by 
Clarke DJ, are royalties for copyright licenses; as Clarke DJ described the 
claimant’s livelihood in another case – Walmsley v Education Limited -  
                                                        
39 For counter example: Crawley v Burda:  mobile phone photographs of people and their pets taken at Essex dog show. 
40 Eg landscape photographs of Bath and Dartmoor by ‘one of the UK’s leading professional landscape photographers’ who licenses his images for 
reproduction in books and as postcards (Croxford v Cotswold, 5.11.2015, at [2]); professional sports photographs taken by a photographer who regularly 
publishes in daily national newspapers (Herringshaw v Everton; Herringshaw v Runham); aerial photographs of Manchester at night taken from a chartered 
helicopter using specialist equipment taken for the purposes of producing a licensing revenue (Webb v VA Events at [20]: ‘Mr Webb says that he knows of only 
one other photographer who has taken similar night time aerial photographs of Manchester’);  photographs of a military aeroplane underwater at Goodwin 
Sands taken by a ‘professional underwater photographer’ for licensing to the press (to illustrate a news story) (Brown v Mayoh, at [1]-[2]: the aeroplane was 
about to be lifted from the seabed by the RAF Museum, in an ‘elaborate and costly project’ (at [7]) and Clarke DJ (at [14]) described the claimant as follows: 
‘He is an experienced underwater photographer. He dives to get his photographs. That is a high-risk business. He is put to the expense of going and doing these 
dives in various places around the world to get his photographs. That is a high-expense business’); ‘an attractive image taken by a professional photographer’ 
of singer/songwriter Florence Welch (of Florence and the Machine) performing in concert taken for the purposes of licensing (Sheldon v Johnson, 21.1.2016, 
at [10]); an image from an album cover of composer Cornelius Cardew (Walmsley v Daily Telegraph, 20.3.2014); ‘glamour photographs’ of fashion models 
taken ‘by a prestigious photographer’ for the purpose of licensing to magazines (Bancroft v Harries, 24.4.2014, at [1] and [6], where Hart DJ also referred to 
the claimant’s ‘reputation and skill as a photographer and the popularity of her work’); well known photographs of children round a camp fire and the Scottish 
educator Alexander Sutherland Neill taken in the 1960s that ‘many people in the public’ would recognise (Walmsley v Education Limited, 13.3.2014, available 
on Westlaw 2014 WL 2194626, at [3]). 
41 Gamby v Harrison, 15.5.2014, which concerned a freelance professional photographer who conducted business on a commission basis. Consequently, the 
damages calculation was based on the photographer’s daily rate - ‘what a willing photographer would have reasonably charged for the work’ - rather than a 
royalty basis (per Lambert DJ, at [38]). 
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‘the business of creating photographs and selling licence fees in them’,42 
or in the words of Hart DJ in Webb v VA Events, the claimant was a 
‘professional… photographer who earns a living from licensing of images 
to which he owns the copyright.’43  Interestingly, the motivation of the 
overwhelming majority of claimants in bringing these cases appears to be 
purely financial; to obtain remuneration for unauthorised use, rather than 
an objection to the use itself. These claimants did not appear to be 
motivated, for example, by the need to protect their reputation or the 
integrity of their work or the quality of the reproduction. As Clarke DJ 
remarked in one case brought by a picture library:  
Stockfood Limited, the claimant, is in fact a picture agency and is 
in the business of licensing photographs to third party end users 
and would have been delighted to licence this photograph to the 
defendant had the defendant sought a licence as it should have 
done. 44 
In only one case – Croxford v Cotswald - did the claimant complain that 
the defendant’s use ‘damaged the exclusivity of his images’, but the 
claimant’s concern was not to stop the defendant’s use per se; the images 
would have been available to the defendant for licence on a ‘rights 
                                                        
42 Walmsley v Education Limited at [17]. 
43 Webb v VA Events at [1].  
44 At [6]. 
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managed’ basis, requiring the incorporation of metadata identifying the 
claimant as copyright owner, and the concern was that the removal of 
metadata might result in further unlicensed uses and therefore loss of 
further remuneration.45 Indeed, even in the case of a photograph taken to 
illustrate a news story – Brown v Mayoh - where there was ‘value to a 
publisher in being the first with an image of a current event’, the claimant 
merely sought to ensure that the defendant paid a ‘first publication 
premium’ on top of the standard royalty, rather than to prevent usage per 
se.46 
The focus of these claimants on the recovery of lost financial 
remuneration – is consistent with freelance professional photographers’ 
pre-IPEC litigation practice. Before the establishment of the IPEC SCT, 
photographers would respond to copyright infringement by issuing the 
suspected infringer with an invoice demanding royalties retrospectively 
for the unauthorised use. When this was unpaid, the photographer would 
then enforce the sum due under the invoice as a debt – an ordinary money 
claim - using the small claims procedure of the County Courts. As one 
photographer with whom we corresponded described: 
I don't know how widespread [the practice] was but the Bow 
County Court worked that way, as did a couple of other London 
                                                        
45 At [15]. 
46 Brown v Mayoh at [3], [18] and [20]. The first publication premium was calculated as a 100 per cent uplift on the standard royalty. 
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County Courts that I used. I'd spot an infringement, invoice for it 
and then, if unpaid, I'd just issue a money claim for the invoice 
value.47 
This approach to dealing with infringement is consistent with the findings 
of an online survey of professional photographers published by the 
British Photographic Council in 2010, 48  which found that the ‘most 
common way in which infringements were pursued was to ask for 
payment for the infringing use.’49  
Asked whether the practice of pursuing infringements as money-
claims in the County Courts continued post-IPEC SCT, the same 
interviewee explained that while the IPEC SCT procedure, though ‘not 
too complex’ was ‘much more’ complex ‘than a simple unpaid debt 
claim’, the IPEC SCT offered a distinct advantage: 
On the plus side, IPEC SCT can and does add damages for breach 
of moral rights, flagrancy and can add exemplary damages. This 
                                                        
47 Email dated 15 October 2016, between freelance professional photographer and Elena Cooper, replying to posting on Editorial Photographers UK website. 
See also Sheldon v Daybrook discussed at text to n35, which originated as a money claim at Northampton County Court ([8]). 
48 The British Photographic Council, Industry Survey of Photographers 2010: Full Results and Analysis (London: British Photographic Council: July 2010) 
available at http://www.british-photographic-council.org/survey/2010. The survey covered 1,698 photographers, but the results were ‘filtered’ to include only 
the responses of ‘professional photographers and/or picture suppliers (p 1, [0.6]); of the ‘professional photographers’, 91 per cent were ‘freelance 
photographers’ (p 4-5, [2.3]). 
49 BPC Survey, Ibid, [25.3]. A reference to the use of the Small Claims procedure is made in the Survey at p 53 [26.2]. 
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leads to awards greater (sometimes very much greater) than the 
simple reproduction fee and makes taking a case worthwhile.50 
The advantage that photographers perceive to be offered by the IPEC 
SCT, over the County Court money-claim procedure, then, relates to the 
possibility of increased financial remuneration for use of their work.51  
 
(c) The Legal Basis of Claims  
Returning to our analysis of the transcribed IPEC SCT rulings, the 
motivation of claimants (as explained in the previous section) focussing 
on the recovery of lost remuneration, impacts on the basis of their legal 
case in a number of ways.  
First, claims about the infringement of moral rights – rights 
attaching to the author (who may not also be the copyright owner) 
concerning non-economic interests in, for example, ensuring attribution 
(section 77 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988) and 
                                                        
50 Ibid. 
51 The same correspondent pointed out that another weakness of the County Court procedure was that a County Court claim would fail where a substantive 
copyright issue was raised by a defendant (eg subsistence, ownership, infringement or defences). By contrast, these issues can be resolved by the IPEC SCT. 
However, as noted at text to n38, the experience so far shows that substantive issues are in practice rarely raised in the IPEC SCT. In any event, as the case of 
Sheldon v Daybrook (discussed above, text to n 35) illustrates, were a County Court money claim to be initiated today, the County Courts would transfer the 
case to the IPEC SCT, which would allow the statement of claim to be amended to a claim for copyright infringement; indeed the review by one co-author of 
all IPEC SCT court files in the period 2012-2015, revealed 17 cases brought by freelance professional photographers which were started in the County Courts 
(two as Money Claims On-line) and subsequently transferred to the IPEC SCT, including four cases in our set of transcribed judgments: review by Sheona 
Burrow. The transcribed cases are: Yeats v Wright, Bancroft v Harries, Gamby v Harrison and Crowley v Burda. 
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protecting the work against ‘derogatory treatment’ (section 80 of the 
CDPA 1988) – in fact are utilised as rights concerned with economic 
interests, rather than the cultural significance of authorship and the 
integrity of the work; claims to lack of attribution or derogatory treatment 
succeed in cases where the claimant argues that ‘orphaning’ the work 
through removal of copyright notices or metadata such that the copyright 
owner cannot be traced, will deprive the author of future licensing 
income.  
For example, in Croxford v Cotswolds, Lambert DJ held that the 
right of attribution under section 77, was infringed where the removal of 
the claimant’s metadata and imposition of the defendant’s own 
watermark on the work, as the result of this was that the claimant was 
‘deprived of the right to charge licence fees to other parties’.52 Similarly, 
in Webb v VA Events, Hart DJ held that the orphaning of an image 
through the removal of the claimant’s metadata and the addition of the 
defendant’s own copyright notice, could amount to derogatory treatment 
of the work under section 80. Section 80 is infringed where ‘the addition, 
deletion from or alternation to or adaption’ of a work ‘amounts to 
distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to the 
honour or reputation of the author’. The ruling in Webb v VA Events is 
striking as case law under section 80 concerns changes to the work’s 
                                                        
52 Croxford v Cotswolds, [47]. 
 23 
‘internal integrity or logic’, rather than the identifying material. 53 Yet, in 
the IPEC SCT, the only claim for derogatory treatment concerning 
additions, deletions, alterations or adaptions to the work itself - Webb v 
Hope Lettings - failed on the basis that the claimant would have 
consented to the use of the work, had a licence been sought; the 
claimant’s objection was not to the use per se, but rather that no 
remuneration was paid for the use. As Hart DJ explained in Webb v Hope 
Lettings, where the claimant’s photograph was ‘heavily cropped’ and 
‘additions to it’ made for ‘marketing purposes’: 
… in order to award damages for derogatory treatment I need to be 
satisfied that there is a distortion or mutilation of the work which is 
prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author.  I am not 
satisfied that that criterion is met here.  The reality is that Mr Webb 
would have been perfectly happy with the amendments under an 
appropriate licensing agreement. So I do not think this really fulfils 
the test of derogatory treatment.54   
                                                        
53 L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed. 2014) p 283, referring to Pasterfield v Denham [1999] FSR 
168, 180. Other cases on moral rights have also concerned changes to the work itself, eg the reduction in size and addition of colour to drawings (Tidy v 
Trustees of the Natural History Museum [1996] EIPR D-86) and the superimposition of rap onto a musical work (Confetti v Warner Museum [2003] EMLR 
790). 
54 Webb v Hope Lettings 10.7.2014 at [12]. This approach to the construction of Copyright Designs and Patents Act s.80, requiring prejudice to the honour or 
reputation of the author in all cases (rather than as an alternative to showing distortion or mutilation), is consistent with that adopted in the High Court: 
Confetti Records v Warner Music [2003] EWHC 1274 (Ch) at [149]-[150].  
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Secondly, the motivation of claimants colours the nature of the 
remedies sought for copyright infringement. In all judgments reviewed, 
the claimant sought damages rather than an account of profits; the 
purpose of the action in all cases, save for one, 55  was to receive 
retrospective payment for the licence fee that should have been paid for 
the use. This practice is also clear from the review of all Claim Forms on 
the court files: where a damages calculation was provided in the Claim 
Form, it was, with just one exception,56 on a royalty basis, and this was 
frequently based on standard licensing schemes, eg, Getty, London 
Freelance National Union of Journalist rates.57  
Further, only one case involved a claim for an injunction - Seaward 
v Foxtons – and this was where a defendant, that had no intention of 
paying for use of the photographs, had repeatedly evaded questions about 
the extent of use of the photographs. 58  Similarly, in Croxford v 
Cotswolds, while an injunction was not formally pleaded in the claim 
form, the claimant, during the course of argument, requested ‘an order 
that the defendants removed any images which infringed his copyright’ 
from their websites, in circumstances where the defendant again had 
                                                        
55 Gamby v Harrison, see above n 42. 
56 The exception involved a claim for loss of profits. 
57http://www.londonfreelance.org/feesguide/index.php?&section=Photography&subsect=Online+use+of+photos, http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/ 
58 The claimant had requested that the defendant estate agents use his own photographs of his home for the purposes of selling his property, but, after the 
property was sold, the defendant used them for other sales/marketing purposes. 
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failed to be transparent about the use of the claimant’s images. 59 
Interestingly, this order does not appear to have been granted, as the 
focus of the judgment was on the assessment of financial remedies.60 
Putting Seaward and Croxford to one side, there was no mention that an 
injunction was even threatened, for instance, in the pre-action stage of the 
other IPEC SCT cases we reviewed. 
In certain other cases, injunctions were perhaps not requested 
because take-down was already effected by the defendant, but this was 
not the position in all cases; in one case the infringing use had persisted 
for over a year after the claim was notified, and continued at the time of 
the hearing on quantum, which took place a month after summary 
judgment for the claimant had been granted.61 Further, injunctive relief 
also concerns the prevention of future use,62 and this does not appear to 
be a concern articulated by claimants (except, as in Seaward and 
Croxford where a defendant appeared to have been untrustworthy). A 
possible explanation for the lack of concern about future use may be the 
                                                        
59 Croxford v Cotswold, [8] and [21]. 
60 The details of the Order in this case can be found at [42], [45] and [47], [48-9], [50]. 
61 Success Photography v Tempest 21.11.2013, [6] and [7]. Clarke DJ commented that the claimant could have claimed an ‘increased licence fee’ in respect of 
the continuing use.  
62 In Spectravest v  Aperknit,[1988] FSR 161, 174, Millett J: ‘In intellectual property cases a plaintiff is concerned not only to stop exact repetition of the 
defendant’s current activity which can be described with particularity, but to prevent fresh invasions of his rights in ways which cannot be foreseen or 
described exactly.’. 
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more general objective of certain freelance professional photographers 
revealed in interviews conducted by one co-author: on discovery of an 
infringement, the objective is ‘to turn’ an infringer ‘into a customer’ by 
charging a licence fee. As one photographer expressed:  
if you want to go on using [my picture] that’s fine but you need to 
pay me something for this use, this is my copyright… this is how I 
make my living…63  
Indeed, the interviews revealed that some photographers were prepared to 
spend substantial proportions of their working time (15-20% of their 
working week) locating infringements (whether through their own efforts 
or using an infringement search agency) targeting those infringers who 
might be ‘people who I want to buy a licence’.64 In particular, the absence 
of claims to an injunction cannot be attributed to ignorance of the law. 
Claimants appear to have good knowledge of copyright law; while Claim 
Forms are rarely drafted by legal representatives (only in 8/122 cases), 45 
per cent of all cases brought by photographers or their agents cited 
relevant provisions of the CDPA 1988 (55/122). Therefore, claimants are 
likely to be aware of the availability of an injunction under s.96(2) CDPA 
1988. 
                                                        
63 Interview conducted by Sheona Burrow in July 2016 with a freelance photographer working in photography for commercial and advertising sectors. 
64 Interview conducted by Sheona Burrow in July 2016 with a freelance professional photographer working in news and social affairs reportage. The same 
interviewee also discussed the charges imposed on infringers, with those that admitted infringement being turned ‘into a customer’. 
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Finally, in framing their claims, photographers often treat the 
infringing use as a supply of services and claim for VAT, as if the claim 
was for an unpaid invoice. This perhaps reflects the manner in which 
photographers framed claims concerning photographic copyright 
infringement prior to the IPEC SCT: as money claims in the County 
Court (discussed above). Claims for VAT are generally not accepted by 
the Court in copyright infringement actions:65 damages, unlike disputes 
for unpaid invoices, are not considered to be a supply for VAT 
purposes.66  
 
(d) The Assessment of Financial Remedies 
How are financial remedies assessed by the IPEC SCT? The legal test for 
general compensatory damages for copyright infringement in cases where 
intellectual property rights ‘are exploited through the grant of licences for 
royalty payments’, is the sum that the defendant ‘would have paid by way 
of royalty’67 and the IPEC Multi-track has ruled that the UK approach to 
compensatory damages is left unchanged by the EU Enforcement 
                                                        
65 Eg: Webb v Central Media [36]. Walmsley v Telegraph [7], though for a counter-example: Walmsley v Education Limited [10] and [13]. 
66 https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-supply-and-consideration/vatsc36100  and https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/vat-supply-and-
consideration/vatsc36300  
67 General Tire v Firestone, [1975] FSR 273, 278 
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Directive. 68  Accordingly, the approach in the IPEC SCT in the vast 
majority of cases, 69  follows that explained by Lord Wilberforce in 
General Tire v Firestone: this involves the court enquiring into, not just 
the ‘going rate’, but also the ‘circumstances’ in which the claimant and 
defendant are ‘assumed to strike their bargain’.70 In the majority of IPEC 
SCT judgments reviewed, the courts take, as a starting point for the 
hypothetical licence negotiations, either the claimant photographer’s own 
standard licensing terms71 or, in the case of an action brought by a picture 
library (as the photographer’s exclusive licensee) that library’s own 
licensing terms,72 and/or the terms of well known photographic picture 
libraries, such as Getty and/or Corbis, or, in the case of photographs in 
newspapers, the standard licensing terms of the National Union of 
Journalists.73 This reflects the way in which damages calculations are 
                                                        
68 Absolute Lofts v Artisan Home Improvements, [2015] EWHC 2608 (IPEC) at [11]. Art 13(1) of the Enforcement Directive, which concerns ‘damages’ 
awards against infringers who engaged in an infringing activity ‘knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know’, expressly mentions that damages can be 
calculated by reference to ‘the amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellectual 
property right in question’ (Art 13(1)b). 
69 Exception: Gamby v Harrison, see above n 43. 
70 At 279 
71 Eg Webb v Central Media; Webb v Hope Lettings; Webb v VA; Walmsley v Education Limited; Success Photography v Tempest. 
72 Eg Stockfood v Quality Garden 14.5.2015; Stockfood v Red Pub 4.9.2014. For the relationship between Stockfood and photographer: Stockfood v Red Pub 
at [2]. 
73 Eg Doré v Hendrich; Seaward v Foxtons; Sheldon v Johnson; Bancroft v Harries, Brown v Mayoh. 
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presented in Claim Forms (discussed above74) and which in turn reflects 
the high degree of collective discussion on the part of photographers on 
how infringement and IPEC litigation should be approached (through the 
education initiatives of photographer membership organisations as well 
as collective discussion in on-line forums). 75  The exception to this 
starting point is where prior dealings between the claimant and defendant 
provide more direct evidence as to their likely agreement, but there were 
few cases of this nature; in the overwhelming majority of cases the 
claimant and defendant were not previously acquainted.76 Further, our 
analysis reveals that in the majority of cases in which standard rates 
formed the starting point of negotiations, the IPEC SCT has held that the 
result of the hypothetical ‘negotiations’ would have been the application 
of those standard rates without any modification;77 in most of these cases, 
                                                        
74 Text to n 58-59. 
75 Eg education initiatives are run by the Association of Photographers and Editorial Photographers UK and Ireland. A further 11 membership organisations 
are referred to in the survey of photographers conducted by the British Photographic Council, above n 49, 1 [0.1]. The collective organisation of photographers 
was referred to by photographers in interviews conducted by Sheona Burrow. One freelance professional photographer interviewed in May 2013 mentioned the 
use of online forums where photographers discussed infringement and court action. 
76 Eg Croxford v Cotswald; Crawley v Burda; in only three of the 21 cases considered did the claimant and defendant know each other prior to the 
infringement.  
77 Webb v Central Media at [21] and [33]; Webb v Hope Lettings at [11] and [15]; Stockfood v Quality Garden at [7]; Success Photography v Tempest at [8]; 
Stockfood v Red Pub at [40] (the rates of Getty Images and Corbis were also considered as comparators at [39]); Seaward v Foxtons at [25] (Corbis rates 
applied); Sheldon v Johnson at [13] (Getty rates applied); Bancroft v Harries at [5] and [7](Getty and NUJ standard rates applied). 
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these are the standard rates of picture libraries.78 Indeed, picture library 
rates have been applied in cases regardless of whether the claimant in fact 
licences through those libraries.79 
In addition to compensatory damages, in a significant number of 
cases (7 of 21 transcribed cases), the claimant also seeks damages for 
non-attribution of authorship under section 77 of the Copyright Designs 
and Patents Act 1988,80 and/or additional damages under section 97(2) of 
the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 81  (12 of 21 transcribed 
cases).82 The latter section empowers the court to award ‘such additional 
damages as the justice of the case may require’ taking into account all the 
circumstances, in particular ‘the flagrancy of the infringement’ and ‘any 
benefit accruing to the defendant by reason of the infringement’. In the 
IPEC SCT, claimants usually refer to the latter as damages for 
                                                        
78 Stockfood v Quality Garden at [7]; Stockfood v Red Pub at [40] (the rates of Getty Images and Corbis were also considered as comparators – at [39]); 
Seaward v Foxtons at [25](Corbis rates applied); Sheldon v Johnson at [13] (Getty rates applied); Bancroft v Harries at [7](Getty and NUJ standard rates 
applied). 
79 Eg Sheldon v Johnson; Bancroft v Harries. 
80 Moral rights are actionable as breach of statutory duty: Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 s.103(1). 
81 In Absolute Lofts, at [42], the IPEC Multi-Track held that Art.13(1) of the Enforcement Directive entitles a defendant to claim a defendant’s ‘unfair profits’ 
as an alternative to additional damages under s.97(2), whichever is greater. This approach sits uneasily with the domestic law distinction between damages and 
an account of profits. The confusion on this point is perhaps the result of the ‘broad sense’ in which the term ‘damages’ is used in Art 13 of the Directive 
(noted by the Court of Appeal in Hollister v Medik Ostomy Supplies  [2012] EWCA Civ 1419 at [60]). 
82 Five out of the 21 transcribed cases included claims for both non-attribution and additional damages. Only one case concerned a successful claim for 
damages for derogatory treatment: Webb v VA Events, at [28], where DJ Hart awarded 500 per cent uplift by way of additional damages and derogatory 
treatment together.  
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‘flagrancy’, and IPEC SCT judgments approach this as requiring 
‘conduct which is in some way scandalous or deceitful’; ‘some deliberate 
or calculated infringement which must go beyond the usual position 
where someone publishes without permission...’ 83  This interpretation 
accords with that adopted by the High Court;84 the impact of Art 13(1) of 
the Enforcement Directive - which concerns ‘damages’ awards against 
infringers who engaged in an infringing activity ‘knowingly, or with 
reasonable grounds to know’ – on the interpretation of section 97(2) was 
not raised in the IPEC SCT judgments which we reviewed.85  
The usual approach in IPEC SCT cases is to assess damages under 
both section 77 and section 97, as each justifying a 100 per cent uplift on 
general damages. 86 An explanation for this starting point is not given in 
any of the judgments reviewed. However, it may stem from the fact that 
                                                        
83 Walmsley v Daily Telegraph, [15] per Hart DJ.  
84 In Flogas Britain v Calor Gas [2013] EWHC 3060 (Ch) [136] defining ‘flagrancy’ as requiring  ‘scandalous and deceitful conduct’ on the part of the 
defendant. In Nottinghamshire Healthcare v News Group [2002] RPC 49 at [52], it was held that deliberation included recklessness – a ‘couldn’t care less’ 
attitude – to infringement. 
85 The European Court of Justice has recently held that damages for ‘moral prejudice’ can be claimed in addition to damages calculated on a royalty basis 
(‘the amount of royalties or fees which would have been due if the infringer had requested’ a licence) despite the fact that ‘moral prejudice’ is not expressly 
mentioned in the relevant provision of the Directive (Art 13(1)b, Christian Liffers v Producciones Mandarina SL, Case C-99/15), however this only applies to 
cases falling within Art 13(1), ie where the infringement was committed by a defendant knowingly or with reason to believe (Irina Nikolajeva v Multi Protect, 
C-280/15, ECJ 7th Chamber, [54]). 
86 100 per cent uplift under s.77: Stockfood v Quality Garden at [8]. 100 per cent uplift under s.97(2): Sheldon v Johnson at [15]; Webb v Central Media at 
[44]; Brown v Mayoh at [17]. For an exception where an unexplained figure of £1,000 was awarded, the general damages award being £360: Webb v Hope 
Lettings at [15].  
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this is the way photographers, in the main, calculate damages under both 
section 77 and section 97 in their Claim Forms, which again reflects the 
high degree of collective organisation on the part of photographers in 
using the IPEC.87  It was observed that the majority of Claim Forms 
included a 100 per cent uplift for additional damages and there was 
evidence of collective practice in drafting Claim Forms: some 28 per cent 
of Claim Forms/Particulars of Claim (35/122) followed a recognisable 
standard format, including a standard damages calculation, claiming 100 
per cent uplift for ‘flagrancy’, and 100 per cent uplift for removal of 
metadata, in addition to a basic licence fee, interest and administration 
costs. Further, an early IPEC SCT judgment - one of the few judgments 
that is publicly available – Walmsley v Education Limited, the claimant 
referred to a 100 per cent uplift, which was applied in that case by the 
Court, as the ‘standard’ royalty ‘in the industry’ for reproduction without 
attribution.88  
 
(e) Analysis: Freelance Professional Photographers and the IPEC 
SCT 
As the above discussion shows, the role of the IPEC SCT, as Lambert DJ 
has expressly acknowledged in a number of cases, is to give effect to the 
                                                        
87 See above n 77. 
88 Ibid, at [13]. 
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fact that ‘a photographer is entitled to a realistic remuneration for his 
work’;89 this reflects the fact that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
the complaint is not about the use itself, but about lack of payment for 
that use. The role of the Court, in this context, is to order a defendant to 
pay retrospectively the licence fee that would have rendered that use 
legal.  
Further, we observed that the Court, in giving effect to the 
photographer’s right to remuneration, is playing an active role in 
supporting a culture of payment and denying legitimacy to the assertion 
that works are free to use in the internet environment, requiring neither 
authorisation nor payment. In a number of cases, the defendants argued 
that they assumed they did not require a licence as images found on 
Google Images were either generally ‘understood to be free’90 or that 
‘images… on Google images without a copyright notice on … were free 
to use…’91 This was also a common argument in Defences generally in 
the IPEC SCT. 92  Whilst innocence is no defence to copyright 
infringement, a plaintiff is not entitled to damages where a defendant ‘did 
not know and had no reason to believe, that copyright subsisted in the 
                                                        
89 Herringshaw v Everton at [22] per Lambert DJ; Stockfood v Red Pub at [32] per Lambert DJ. 
90 Webb v Central Media at [5] per Lambert DJ: ‘His instructions were to use Google Images, which he understood to be free.’   
91 Walmsley v Education Limited at [6] per Clarke DJ: ‘the teacher responsible for the blog post found the images on Google images without any copyright 
rubric upon them and believed that if those images were on Google images without a copyright notice on them that meant that they were free to use…’ 
92 As observed in the review of IPEC SCT Court files conducted by Sheona Burrow. 
 34 
work’ (section 97(1) CDPA 1988). The Court has stressed that section 
97(1) is a ‘very narrow’ provision 93  and rejects such arguments, 
characterising them as ‘naïve’ and evidencing a ‘shocking lack of 
understanding’ about copyright.94  
How does the analysis in the last two sections relate to the 
theoretical framework provided by Calabresi and Melamed? Our review 
of the IPEC SCT judgments in the first three years since its establishment 
reveals an interesting inter-relation between the bureaucratisation of 
photographic copyright (ie exploitation through picture libraries) and the 
nature of the remedies granted by the IPEC SCT. The bureaucratisation 
of photographic copyright has brought about a standardisation in 
licensing. On the one hand, copyright doctrine continues to reflect a 
property rule paradigm: claimants can request an injunction, should they 
wish to do so, and the legal test in General Tire requires the courts to 
consider the hypothetical negotiations in a bilateral licensing contract (an 
                                                        
93 Webb v VA Events, per Hart DJ. 
94 At [20]. Webb v Hope Lettings at [7] per Hart DJ: ‘It is naive for anyone to believe that just because an image is available on Google copyright does not 
subsist in that image.’  Bancroft v Harries at [3] per Hart DJ: ‘he used these images which he obtained on the web, they were freely available on the web and 
that there was no metadata attached to them.  … It is … simply not sufficient, in my view, for a defendant to say that the reasonable starting point would be 
that any image they come across on the internet that does not have metadata attached to it is necessarily free from copyright protection.  That would be a naïve 
standpoint for somebody like Mr Harries operating a commercial website to take.’ Walmsley v Education Limited at [16] per Clarke DJ: ‘the teacher assumed 
any image found on Google without a copyright notice attached would be free to use shows a shocking lack of understanding of copyright protection. … I do 
not think, in this day and age to look online and see what are clearly professional photographs and to say to oneself “if there is no copyright notice it must be 
all right for me to use them”.’ 
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approach which, in the Calabresi/Melamed framework, corresponds with 
copyright’s nature as a property rule). However, on the other hand, 
injunctions are rarely claimed and the calculation of damages most 
frequently merely involves the application of rates which are generally 
available to all who seek them. This provides photographic copyright, as 
litigated in the IPEC SCT, with features of a liability rule – ‘a general 
rule of compensation applicable to all who take the right’95. In this way, 
this case study contributes to scholarship noting other instances in which 
intellectual property rights are of an ‘intermediate nature somewhere 
between pure individual property rights and pure government-determined 
liability rules’. 96  In Contracting into Liability Rules, Robert Merges, 
applying the Calabresi/Melamed framework, described the circumstances 
in which intellectual property rights, while ‘quintessential property rule 
entitlements’ at first instance, can lead to a ‘liability rule-like regime’: 
where transaction costs are high, rights-holders will agree to collective 
valuation through collective organisations (eg collecting societies) as 
opposed to ‘strictly individual’ or ‘specific bilateral’ terms. 
Consequently, argues Merges, the distinction between property rules and 
liability rules becomes a ‘false dichotomy’; instead the standards of such 
collective organisations represent ‘intermediate forms of collective 
                                                        
95 Merges, above n 1, 1303. 
96 Ibid, 1392. 
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valuation’ as ‘firms work together to establish a collective price charged 
to licensees for use of the members’ IPRS’. 97 Our case study illustrates 
how the practices of such collective organisations can also shape more 
general enforcement by the courts, including in litigation brought by 
claimants who are not members of collective organisations. We return to 
this finding in the final concluding section of the article.98 Before we do 
so, we turn to the experience from earlier times, that saw the foundation 
of the first photographic picture libraries.  
 
3 Photographic Copyright and Enforcement in Historical 
Perspective 
 
(a) Introducing the Historical Case Study 
In the previous section, we reported a number of findings about 
photographic copyright litigation in the IPEC SCT, placing them in the 
context of the motivation of photographers and practices of copyright 
exploitation. While the establishment of a specialised Court for 
intellectual property small claims is a new development - exclusive to the 
twenty-first century – some of our underlying observations (made in the 
last section) pre-date the IPEC SCT. In particular, the first picture 
                                                        
97 Ibid. 1302, 1303 and 1392. 
98 Text to n 169. 
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libraries were established in the first years of the twentieth century. How 
and why did this occur, and how might the experience of past times help 
us more critically engage with our analysis in the last Part about the 
enforcement of photographic copyright in the IPEC SCT  today?  
By way of background, photography was invented in 1839, but 
first emerged as a medium of mass reproduction in the 1850s, with the 
advent of the collodion or wet-plate process.99 The first copyright statute 
expressly protecting photographs was passed in 1862 – the Fine Arts 
Copyright Act 100  - and during the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century photographers utilised this legal protection to prevent the 
unauthorised reproduction of photographs which they sold to the public 
in the form of cartes-de-visite (collectors cards size 6 x 10cm) or larger 
cabinets (measuring 10 x 16cm, so-called as they could be displayed on a 
cabinet or bureau). Photographers sold cartes and cabinets through a wide 
range of retailers such as print shops, stationers, booksellers and novelty 
shops, 101  and the celebrity carte trade also had their own London 
wholesaler – Marion & Co –stocking thousands of celebrity photographs, 
                                                        
99 M Langford The Story of Photography: From its Beginnings to the Present Day (Oxford: Focal Press, 2nd ed., 1997), pp 11-16, 22-34 and 35. 
100 25 & 26 Vic. c.68. 
101 A Linkman The Victorians : Photographic Portraits (London: Tauris Parke, 1993) p 66. 
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with some 50,000 cartes passing through the firm’s hands every month 
by 1862.102  
Technological change in the 1890s, however, changed these 
business practices. The introduction of ‘process’ reprographic techniques, 
for the first time enabled photographs to be printed alongside typeset 
material.103 This opened up new channels for photographic reproduction 
in the illustrated press that, in turn, extinguished trade in cartes and 
cabinets. The 1890s saw the advent of a large number of illustrated 
papers reproducing photographs,104 including the Daily Graphic, ‘the first 
really successful picture paper’ owned by advocate of social reform 
William Luson Thomas.105   By 1899, an article in the Contemporary 
Review observed that ‘some-half dozen journals’ were ‘entirely run’ by 
the publication of photographs. 106  In 1904, the Daily Mirror was 
launched by Alfred Harmsworth, the proprietor of the Daily Mail, as the 
first half-penny daily illustrated newspaper,107 and this was followed by 
the Daily Sketch in 1909, owned by Manchester based proprietor Edward 
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Hulton.108 While the Daily Graphic of the 1890s could print illustrated 
pages at a mere 10,000 copies per hour, by 1904 printing technology had 
improved so that the Daily Mirror could print 24,000 per hour.109 
Unlike the trade in cartes and cabinets, where the reproductions 
sold to the public were made by the photographers themselves, the new 
opportunities offered by the illustrated press took the reproduction and 
dissemination of photographs out of the photographers’ ‘own hands’.110 
Photographers now sought to make a living through licensing the 
copyright in their images. Establishing a licensing income from press 
reproduction, however, was an uphill battle. By the 1890s, photographs 
were widely reproduced in the illustrated press, but these reproductions 
were generally unauthorised and no payment was made to the 
photographer. For photographers of the 1890s, then, the illustrated press 
were a new ‘class of pirates’.111  
 
(b) Broad v Baines and the Photographic Copyright Union 
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Broad v. Baines, decided in 1891, drew attention to how photographic 
copyright law might transform the photographers’ fortunes. 112  In that 
case, Lord Randolph Churchill had agreed to write a series of letters 
about his tour in South Africa to be published in the Daily Graphic. With 
one such letter, Churchill included a photograph of a coach being upset in 
South Africa, and the Daily Graphic proceeded to reproduce the 
photograph alongside the letter. The copyright of the photograph was in 
fact owned by the photographer Mr Broad, who applied for an injunction 
in the Court of Chancery to restrain the issue of any further copies of the 
Daily Graphic. Following the grant of the injunction, settlement was 
reached, obliging the defendant pay to Mr Broad an agreed sum by way 
of damages and costs.  
While the ruling in Broad reflected copyright’s nature as a property 
rule, for the photographic trade press, the focus was on the financial 
outcome; the case drew attention to the potential for photographers to 
turn the widespread reproduction of their photographs in the press to their 
financial advantage. After all, at the root of photographers’ grievances 
was money, as the usual sources of income through the sale of cartes and 
cabinets was ‘pretty well exterminated’ by press reproductions.113As the 
British Journal of Photography commented in considering the case: 
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Many of the illustrated papers pay large sums for the privilege of 
copying a painting; why should not a photographer receive 
something for permission to reproduce his pictures?114 
Some two years later, complaints of ‘piracy’ by the illustrated 
press continued to be made, the photographic press noting that 
photographs were treated as ‘common property’, there being no culture of 
authorisation or payment.115 In July 1893, a meeting was held at the Hotel 
Victoria near Trafalgar Square of representatives of leading firms 
specialising in celebrity portraits. These included Alexander Bassano 
whose portrait studio on Old Bond Street was one of the ‘model 
establishments of the West End’,116 William Downey junior of W&D 
Downey whose studio in the ‘neighbourhood of Buckingham Palace’ who 
were specialists in ‘photographing titled personages’,117 Joseph J. Elliott 
of Elliott & Fry the ‘eminent firm’ based in Baker Street whose success 
in portraiture could ‘run portrait painters hard’,118 in addition to Frank 
Bishop of photographic wholesaler Marion & Co. At this meeting, a 
resolution was passed:119 
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that a fee should be charged for all copyright photographs 
reproduced in any illustrated paper or periodical, and that the 
minimum charge should be one guinea; also that the name and 
address of the photographer should be legibly printed under each 
impression.120 
This resolution set the basis for the approach of photographers to the 
illustrated press going forward.  
This approach was given a three month trial, following which the 
representatives held a further meeting, and it was unanimously agreed to 
renew the resolution.121 In January 1894, wider participation was sought, 
which resulted in the formation of the Photographic Copyright Union 
which invited membership from ‘photographers’ throughout the 
country.122  
The Union was established under the auspices of the London 
Chamber of Commerce, which allowed its members to form a ‘Trade 
Section’ for the purposes of ‘representing more effectually the interest of 
any particular trade.’123 The Union was therefore formed to protect trade 
interests, with the focus on responding to the loss of a ‘once… lucrative 
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branch’ of work to the illustrated press.124 At the helm of the Union was a 
Committee comprised of representatives of the leading portrait studios 
mentioned above, including Frank Bishop, William Downey junior, 
Joseph Elliott, in addition to J. Lillie Mitchell of the London Stereoscopic 
Company, another leading firm in the celebrity portrait trade.125 During 
the course of 1895, they were joined by representatives of leading firms 
in landscape photography, for example Frith & Co of Reigate (that had 
been founded by Francis Frith),126 and others such as Gambier Bolton, a 
Fellow of the Zoological Society who lectured in natural history and 
specialised in photographs of animals.127 
The Union’s first actions were to reduce the minimum royalty from 
one guinea to half a guinea for the use of ‘each subject, for one issue 
only’, in response to objections on the part of the illustrated press. It was 
reported that this new royalty level was communicated by the Union to 
the illustrated press in London, and that it was ‘generally accepted.’128 
Attention was also given to spreading awareness of photographic 
copyright law amongst photographers, with a pamphlet explaining the 
general principles of photographic copyright law by Joseph Elliott sent to 
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all members for free.129 Just one month after its launch, in February 1894, 
it was reported that nearly 700 replies had been received expressing a 
wish to join the Union.130 By April, membership had risen to 800, and a 
fund was set up for paying the cost of legal advice for members engaged 
in copyright disputes,131 with standard form licence agreements issued to 
all members by June.132 The result was that by November of the same 
year, the Union could declare that its members had recovered ‘upwards of 
1,000l… in the shape of fees for the use of … copyrights and penalties’ 
(around £120,000 today).133 From that point onwards, the Union became 
a subscription based organisation, members paying a membership fee of 
10s 6d per annum, and one third of any compensation received through 
an action brought by the Union’s solicitors was to be retained by the 
Union.134  
The illustrated press, however, argued that there was a lack of 
legitimacy to the photographers’ demands for licence fees; 
photographers, the press argued, were ‘ethically to blame for making … 
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money out of copyrights’135 because ‘a photograph is such a machine-
made production that it is absurd, if not immoral, to put a value on any 
copyright in it….’, in particular where the ‘big price’ demanded related to 
the notoriety of the subject, rather than the ‘virtue or effort’ of the 
photographer. 136 As a result, from 1895, the Union was put on the 
defensive in defending the legitimacy of the culture of payment that it 
sought to establish. Debates about photographic copyright became 
intertwined with wider questions of photography’s artistic status. In this 
context, recognition of photographic copyright’s parity with painting 
copyright became key to the Union’s strategy. As one article in the 
British Journal of Photography commented: 
No question has ever been raised as to the price that a painter may 
charge for his work… yet he has no greater property in his 
copyright than the photographer has in his. Both have the right to 
fix what price they like upon it…137 
Indeed, British photographers, following the passage of the US 
International Copyright Act of 1891,138  were entitled to photographic 
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copyright in the United States of America139 and would have heard of 
reports of radical attacks that had been launched there against 
photographic copyright by the illustrated press. In 1898 the British 
Journal of Photography reported two attempts by the American 
illustrated press to have legislation passed restricting photographic 
copyright. The Shofroth Bill sought to abolish photographic copyright 
altogether for photographs that were not works of ‘fine art’, and the Hicks 
Bill provided a defence to infringement where a newspaper reproduced a 
photograph which was not a work of ‘fine art.’ 140  Accordingly, the 
Photographers’ Copyright League of America, the Photographic 
Copyright Union would have been aware of the importance of 
‘energetically agitating’ its cause to annihilate such threats.141  
The complex and dynamic relation between copyright and wider 
debates about photography’s artistic status in the UK in the late 
nineteenth century, are fully explored elsewhere.142 The current analysis 
instead focuses on the factors that contributed to the stabilisation of 
photographic copyright as a right to remuneration by the first decade of 
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the twentieth century, such that press photography became a lucrative 
business. As the Photographic Copyright Union could declare in 1903, 
unlike the 1890s, when ‘the publishers and proprietors of newspapers 
could not understand the demand for payment to the photographers’: 
Now we are glad to say that there are no respectable publishers of 
books, newspapers or magazines who desire to make use of a 
photographer’s work without payment. It is a very great advantage 
to all photographers, whether members of the Union or not, to have 
got firmly established this principle, which all sensible men admit 
the justice of.143 
Indeed, by 1905, photographers were advised that ‘reasonably obtainable 
fees’ for press photography were at least double the minimum rate set by 
the Union of 10s 6d per reproduction, with between £5 5s to £10 10s 
obtainable for a whole page reproduction and £2 2s to £3 3s for a half 
page.144  
What explains the stabilisation of photographic copyright as a right 
to remuneration by the early twentieth century? Alongside the increasing 
commercial organisation by photographers, and the standardisation of 
licensing terms promoted by the Photographic Copyright Union, were 
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two other developments that exhibit parallels with the operation of 
photographic copyright in more recent times. We examine these in turn. 
 
 (c) The Emergence of Picture Libraries 
First, the early twentieth century saw the emergence of the first 
bureaucratic management of photographic copyright, facilitating 
reproduction in the illustrated press of any subject that might become 
topical (eg celebrities, places, animals, famous landmarks). In 1901, the 
first picture library was established - the Illustrated Press Bureau145 - and 
by 1909 there were at least a dozen such agencies. 146  Photographers 
would send their photographs to the agency, which would centrally store 
and index the photographs according to their subject matter. Should a 
particular subject become of interest to the press (eg a particular celebrity 
or a landmark featured in a newsworthy story), the role of the agency was 
promptly to offer photographs to all editors, and then collect a royalty for 
reproduction: the agency would pay the royalty to the photographer, 
subject to the agent’s commission, of around twenty five per cent in 
respect of ‘good’ agents. 147  
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The agencies also sourced news photographs: photographs that 
recorded topical events, often referred to as ‘photograms’ to denote their 
nature as the photographic equivalent of a telegram communicating the 
essential facts of a news story. As the British Journal of Photography 
noted in 1903, ‘the modern craving is for facts’ and a photograph 
‘certifies as well as illustrates the incident’; photographs had a 
‘‘certificate’ character’ as ‘the photographer must have been on the spot’ 
unlike ‘the artist in a studio on the Thames Embankment’ that would give 
a story ‘his fancy rein’.148  Indeed, in a bid to ensure photographs of 
newsworthy events could be sourced, agencies often appointed ‘special 
press photographers’: photographers to whom the agency would provide 
‘suggestions of speculative work likely to be profitable’, as a particular 
news story emerged.149  
In this way, agencies became a central feature of trade in 
photographic copyright. As the practical manual Photography for the 
Press advised photographers in 1909:  
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…only in exceptional cases can one afford to do without a press 
agent… by means of these agents a photographer is able to get his 
work offered to a much larger field than if he handled it himself. … 
You receive a greater income from your photograms than you 
would if handled by yourself.150 
The bureaucratisation of the photographic trade through picture libraries 
facilitated the conclusion of transactions between photographers and the 
illustrated press, and in turn, the collection of royalties. Indeed, as one co-
author explains in detail in a monograph to be published next year,151 the 
bureaucratisation also stabilised photographers’ income, by diffusing 
arguments about the relation between photography’s creative status and 
copyright; copyright transactions were experienced (as Thomas Streeter 
argues in relation to the role of collecting societies as regards broadcast 
copyright) in a manner akin to ‘paying taxes’,152 and this obviated the 
need for any substantive discussion of copyright principles such as 
authorship and originality, which had dominated the copyright debates in 
the late 1890s. 
 
 (d) Press Photography and the Courts 
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The second factor that contributed to the entrenchment, by the early 
twentieth century, of the photographers’ right to remuneration from 
reproduction in the illustrated press, was the support of the Courts for the 
basic principle that underpinned photographers licensing practices: the 
principle of a payment per use. While, as we will now see, the courts 
were sometimes unsympathetic to claims for damages (section 11 1862 
Act), claims for statutory penalties (section 6 1862 Act) were 
successful; 153  following the ruling in Ex parte Beal, the courts were 
obliged to grant a penalty per infringement 154  and this principle was 
applied, apart from one early exception (Melville v Mirror of Life, 
decided 1895),155 in a number of cases against the illustrated press. In 
these cases, the courts considered themselves obliged to grant a penalty 
of one coin of the realm per infringement,156 and, as we will now see, in 
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actions against the illustrated press where the print run was high, this 
inevitably produced a significant amount, even though a penalty of only a 
farthing (the lowest coin of the realm) was applied.  
For example, in Ellis v Horace Marshall (1895) which concerned 
the unauthorised reproduction of a photograph of an actress in an 
illustrated paper – a Miss Moore in The Ludgate Monthly - Charles J 
awarded ‘no damages, since they are but nominal’ but proceeded to 
award 26l 0s 10d by way of penalties (calculated as one farthing per 
infringement157) on the basis that ‘I have, according to the authorities no 
alternative… since each copy constitutes a separate offence’.158 Similarly, 
in Nicholls v. Parker (1901),159 Wright J., commented that he did not see 
any ‘way to get out of the law laid down’ in Re Beal and applied in Ellis v 
Marshall, and held that a penalty of a farthing was to be paid by the 
defendant for each of the 86,230 infringing copies printed in a paper 
called the Golden Penny, resulting in an award of £89 11s 8d by way of 
penalties (around £10,000 today); in that case, the claimant was a 
photographer based in Johannesburg, and the defendant had obtained a 
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licence to reproduce the photograph in question - of ‘Officers buying 
Shells as Curios from Kaffir Women’ - in one newspaper they owned (the 
Graphic) but not in the publication in question, which they also owned 
(the Golden Penny). 160  In the 21st century, the enforcement of 
photographic copyright by the IPEC SCT, dispels the argument 
commonly advanced by defendants, that everything on the internet is 
understood to be made available for free reproduction;161 so, in the early 
twentieth century, court judgments played an important role in supporting 
the successful efforts of photographers in establishing a culture of 
payment for reproduction in the illustrated press. 
 
4 Conclusions 
The IPEC SCT and historical case studies explored in this article, while 
rooted in the contexts of very different times, exhibit remarkable 
similarity. In both case studies, copyright authors seek a culture of 
payment for use in the face of resistance from potential licensees 
following relatively new technological developments: the assertion today 
by certain users that works on the internet are free for use and the attacks 
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on photography’s artistic status at the turn of the twentieth century 
following the emergence of the illustrated photographic press. A number 
of common elements feature in photographers’ attempts to counter these 
arguments today and in the past. For example, in both the past and today, 
photographers are collectively organised and standardise their approach 
to infringement: today through the influence of photographer membership 
bodies and informal chat groups, and in the past the initiatives of the 
Photographic Copyright Union.162 Further, both case studies reveal the 
importance of court judgments in providing legal force to the underlying 
principle of payment for use: today the rulings of the IPEC SCT, and in 
the past High Court actions awarding a penalty for each infringement.  
These points of similarity aside, however, a broad historical 
perspective also highlights an important difference about the IPEC SCT, 
within the Calabresi/Melamed framework: a change in the relation 
between court rulings – applying doctrinal rules in which copyright is 
framed as a property rule - and the bureaucratisation of exploitation (ie 
exploitation through collecting societies/picture libraries) – in which 
copyright takes on features of a liability rule by providing, as Robert 
Merges described, ‘a general rule of compensation applicable to all who 
take the right’.163 The bureaucratisation of copyright exploitation, as we 
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have shown, is far from new; indeed, as we have shown, it has a longer 
history than accounted for in existing scholarship. 164  Yet, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, court rulings on photographic 
copyright were relatively well insulated from the influence of picture 
libraries; cases against the illustrated press were, in general, framed as 
actions to recover statutory penalties for infringement, probably because 
ex parte Beal made clear that a penalty was to be recovered per 
reproduction. By contrast, our analysis of IPEC SCT photographic 
copyright rulings reveals cases to be closely shaped by the licensing 
practices of a particular sector (freelance professional photographers). 
IPEC SCT cases predominantly concern quantum of damages, and the 
licensing rates offered by picture libraries serve as an important bench-
mark. Copyright doctrine reflects a property rule rationale: rightholders 
may request an injunction and the test for calculating damages set out by 
the House of Lords in General Tire, requires the Court to enquire into a 
‘strictly individual’ bilateral bargain between willing licensor and 
licensee in the position of the claimant and defendant (an approach which 
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reflects copyright’s ‘property rule’ rationale).165 However, in the IPEC 
SCT, injunctions are rarely threatened or claimed, and collectively 
determined standard picture library rates, offered to whoever seek them, 
often serve as an important proxy in calculating damages; indeed, as we 
have seen, in a large number of cases, picture library rates are applied to 
calculate damages without any modification. In this way, in IPEC SCT 
rulings, unlike the rulings of the High Court in the historical case study, 
the bureaucratisation of copyright exploitation infiltrates the 
interpretation of copyright doctrine, through the influence of standards set 
by picture libraries. Whereas Thomas Streeter – in his study of broadcast 
copyright – presented bureaucratisation (ie exploitation by collecting 
societies) as an administrative ‘simulation’ of property - ‘a representation 
once removed… that has taken on a life of its own, divorced from its 
referent’166 - the legal rulings of the IPEC, in utilising picture library 
standards, provide aspects of the bureaucratic ‘simulation’ of property 
with legal force; bureaucratic standards – rather than mere 
‘representations’ - become part of copyright’s legal reality through their 
judicial application in court decisions. This impacts on the nature of 
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copyright within the Calabresi/Melamed framework, as applied in this 
particular context: copyright law as applied by the IPEC SCT to the 
practices of freelance professional photographers, takes on features of a 
liability rule. 
Our observations about the nature of photographic copyright as 
applied in the IPEC SCT, opens up a number of avenues for critical 
reflection about both how the law today is applied by the IPEC SCT, as 
well as how the law might be re-imagined by policy-makers. First, 
copyright’s property rule basis raises the question of the appropriateness 
of the IPEC SCT’s frequent resort to picture library rates as a proxy for 
what would have been agreed in a bilateral bargain between licensor and 
licensee in the particular position of the claimant and defendant. This is 
especially the case where the claimant has expressly decided not to be a 
member of a picture library;167 the effect of applying picture library rates 
to non-members is to extend the influence of picture library standards 
beyond their contractual mandate.  
Secondly, our case study also enables us also to think critically 
about the approach of policy-makers to changing copyright rules, 
particularly with a view to reducing transaction costs in the internet 
environment. Copyright policy initiatives, most recently, for example, the 
proposal for a new press-publishers neighbouring right as part of the 
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Digital Single Market proposals put forward by the European 
Commission, continue to start from a property rule premise; an essential 
attribute of intellectual property rights is that they are rights to authorise 
or prohibit restricted conduct. 168  While there are examples of recent 
legislative initiatives reducing copyright to a liability rule, interestingly, 
this is premised on the unworkability of a property rationale in certain 
circumstances. For example, the Collective Rights Management 
Directive, facilitating multi-territorial licensing of music through 
collecting societies, concerns rightsholders being ‘remunerated for uses 
which they would not be in a position to control or enforce 
themselves’.169 Similarly, under the Orphan Works Directive, copyright is 
only reduced to a right of remuneration for the period in which the rights-
owner could not be identified or located after a diligent search; where a 
rights-owner wishes to put ‘orphan work status’ to an end, the property 
rule model of copyright is reinstated.170 In both these examples, therefore, 
copyright is reduced to a liability rule only in circumstances where a 
property rule paradigm is seen as unworkable. The analysis in this paper 
suggests that both today and historically, certain groups of rights-holders 
                                                        
168 Art 11(1), Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 593, of 14/9/2016, providing ‘publishers of press publications’ 
with the rights of reproduction and communication to the public (under the Information Society Directive, 2001/29/EC Art 2 and 3) in respect of the ‘digital 
use of their press publications’. 
169 Directive 2014/26/EU, Recital 2. 
170 Directive 2012/28/EU, Art.5 and 6(5). 
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may primarily be interested in copyright as a source of remuneration. 
Further, empirical work may show that certain rightsholders are happy to 
default to picture library rates in the calculation of that remuneration. 
This observation highlights the need for further empirical investigation 
about the needs of rights-holders by those seeking to reform the law, 
which may, in turn, re-open debates about the desirability of a departure 
from a property rule framework in a broader range of circumstances.171  
                                                        
171 Eg, Séverine Dusollier and Caroline Colin, ‘Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Copyright: What Could be the Role of Collective Management?’ (2010-2011) 
34 Colum. J.L. & Arts 809; Rebecca Giblin, ‘Reimaging Copyright’s Duration’ from Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall (eds) What if We Could 
Reimaging Copyright? (forthcoming ANU Press, 2017, available on SSRN) p23; Christian Handke, Bodo Balazs, Joan-Josep Vallbé, ‘Going Means Trouble 
and Staying Makes it Double: The Value of Licensing Recorded Music Online’ (2016) 40 Journal of Cultural Economics 227. Neil W. Netanel ‘Impose a 
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing’ (2003) 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech, 1;  Mark A Lemley, above n 1; Dotan Oliar, above n 1. For 
pre-internet debates: Jerome H. Reichman, above n 1 cf. Robert P Merges, above n 1. 
